SUMMONS + COMPLAINT January 06, 2023 (2024)

Case

George Falzon v. Lorenzo Andres Jordan

Jul 31, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |715721/2024

Case

William Mccarthy v. Damian Pedroza Badillo

Jul 31, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |715653/2024

Case

Junior Bautista Almonte v. Rivka Llc, Abcny Inc.

Jul 31, 2024 |Torts - Other (Trip & Fall) |Torts - Other (Trip & Fall) |715633/2024

Case

V. L. an infant over the age of 14 years by her mother and natural guardian ARACELI LUCERO and, Araceli Lucero individually v. The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation

Jul 31, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |715701/2024

Case

Allison Biggers v. Rockaway Care Center Llc

Aug 05, 2024 |Torts - Other (Premises Liability) |Torts - Other (Premises Liability) |715974/2024

Case

Alyssa Acevedo v. The City Of New York, Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Aegon Usa Realty Advisors Llc

Jul 31, 2024 |Torts - Other Negligence (205-e) |Torts - Other Negligence (205-e) |715634/2024

Case

Felecia Matthews v. Gino Encarnacion, Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P., Penske Truck Leasing Corporation, Addae Temba, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York City Transit Authority, Mta Bus Company, Manhattan And Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority

Jul 31, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |715610/2024

Case

Tova Anna Ariel v. Lorig Yekhpairian, Julius Tenke, Ele Funding Llc, Racheli Abgin, Farhad Abginehsaz

Aug 05, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |716018/2024

Case

Mohamed Ewees v. Pla Logistics Inc., John Doe

Aug 05, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |716004/2024

Ruling

ROBERT GUILLEN VS. OFFICEMAX, LLC ET AL

Aug 06, 2024 |CGC23608846

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Tuesday, Aug-06-2024, Line 7, 1-DEFENDANT OFFICE DEPOT. LLC'S Motion To Compel Plaintiff To Respond To Interrogatories. Pro Tem Judge Scott Borrowman, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: Motion to compel DENIED. While late, the reply acknowledged that responses were served. Sanctions GRANTED in the amount of $660 for 1 hour of attorney fees + the motion fee. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 525 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 525. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to sborrowman@gmail.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(525/JPT)

Ruling

CASSANDRE ROOS VS MICHAEL HANNON, MD, ET AL.

Aug 06, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV01381

Case Number: 23SMCV01381 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: I This is a troubling ex parte application. It appears that plaintiffs counsel has disappeared. Defendant has been trying to depose plaintiff since last September. Plaintiff, who is going to college on the east coast, wants to be deposed remotely and only during breaks. After trying to do that on multiple occasions only to have plaintiff insist on changing the date, defense counsel asked plaintiffs counsel for dates. Then plaintiffs counsel went radio silent. Attempts to call have been unsuccessful and counsel has done nothing to return any attempts by the defense to communicate. The deposition is currently set and properly noticed for August 13, 2024. The court is inclined to DENY the application as having shown no need for exigency and because perhaps plaintiff will appear on August 13, 2024. If plaintiff does appear, well and good. If not, and assuming the defense follows the code, the court would expect a speedy motion to compel further. If the next hearing date is too far away (trial is February 3, 2025), then an application to specially set would be in order. If that results in an order that plaintiff disobeys, then other sanctions would be appropriate. The court is hopeful that this will moot itself out, but a copy of this order should be served by the defense on plaintiffs counsel. If things progress along the current path, the matter is likely to be dismissed in the end.

Ruling

ANIL GUPTA VS LAURIE M LEER

Aug 08, 2024 |23PSCV00917

Case Number: 23PSCV00917 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: O Tentative Ruling Defendant Laurie M. Leer SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 [ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE]; REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1) is GRANTED, but in the reduced amount of $11,135.00. Background This is a defamation case. Plaintiff Dr. ANIL GUPTA (Plaintiff) alleges the following against Defendant Laurie M. Leer (Defendant): On February 10, 2023, Defendant made false statements to others that Plaintiff keeps his medical license for insurance fraud, which was intended to hurt Plaintiffs reputation. (Complaint p. 4 of 4 of PDF.)[1] Plaintiff claims he has been damaged in an amount of $500,000. On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit. On June 9, 2023, Defendant filed her anti-slapp motion. On August 15, 2023, the court issued its final ruling granting the motion. On June 10, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion. On July 12, 2024, the appeal was dismissed. On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the opposition. On August 1, 2024, Defendant filed her reply. Legal Standard This Motion is made on the grounds that Defendant is the prevailing defendant under Civ. Proc. Code, supra, § 425.16, which mandates that the court shall award reasonable attorneys to the prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike. (Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, subd. (c)(1) [emphasis added].) Discussion Here, as the appellate court dismissed Plaintiffs appeal on 4/16/24 due to Plaintiffs failure to cure its default, Defendant, per the courts 8/15/23 order, is entitled to attorney fees, which Plaintiff does not dispute. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the fees are unreasonable. Defendant seeks an award of $31,625 in attorney fees (and $539.25 in costs). According to Defense Counsel Burns declaration, his firm spent a total of 45.7 hours on the matter. For reasons to be discussed below, the court agrees with Plaintiff that the hours expended on the matter and hourly rate are unreasonable. The court will address each category of billing in the order presented in Counsel Burns declaration. a. 7.5 hours spent by Counsel Burns re: Anti-SLAPP motion[2] Counsel Burns, who has 25 years of experience, states that he spent approximately 4.8 hours in connection with reviewing the Complaint and drafting/revising the Anti-SLAPP Motion and 2.7 hours in connection with review of the Opposition, Plaintiffs objections and drafting/revising the Reply and Defendants Objections. Based on his hourly rate of $625/hour, Defendant was billed approximately $4,687.50 for Burns services. Here, as underscored in the courts ruling,[3] the complaint was a four-page form complaint with nine lines of material allegations. Reading (and re-reading) the complaint would reasonably take no more than half an hour. To the extent that Counsel Burns maintains it took longer, even if detailed time records are not necessary (Reply p. 2), no verified time records are submitted that would be entitled to a presumption of credibility. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) As for Counsel Burns work in drafting the motion and papers, the research and writing largely seems to be conducted by Counsel Brown, infra. (Ibid [while a trial court abuses its discretion in rejecting wholesale counsels verified time records, it may deny compensation for inefficient or duplicative work. (Id. at pp. 394-395, quoting Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1130, 1132.)[4] That would leave revising any of the drafted material, which wouldfor a 15-page substantive motion and 6-page replyreasonably take no more than 2 hours. Therefore, the court determines that Counsel Burns reasonably expended 2.5 hours on the matter. As for the hourly rate, Burns has not set forth evidence that his hourly rate is the prevailing rate in this community. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [explaining the reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work]; Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71 [The relevant community is that where the court is located.].) Accordingly, the court reduces the amount $425/hour. (See also Opp. p. 5 [seeking imposition of $425 rate].) And if there is evidence of the prevailing rates in this community, it is presented by Plaintiffs Counsel who has been practicing for 10 years but charges $375/hour. (See Opp. p. 5:8-10.) Thus, the court awards 2.5 hours/$425/hour for a total of $1,062.50 for counsel Burns in association with the anti-slapp motion. b. 37.50 hours for Counsel Brown[5] This included: (1) approximately 10.3 hours in connection with reviewing the Complaint, conducting necessary legal research relating to the applicability of the Anti-SLAPP statute and litigation privileges to Plaintiffs claims for defamation, and also researching potential merits defenses[6] as well as research regarding the applicability of the Anti SLAPP statute and its relation to Medi-Cal laws, as well as the applicability of formal grievances made towards medical providers on whether such grievances fall within the ambit of protected activity of section 425.16, subdivision (e), and communicating with our client in the investigation and gathering of applicable evidence for her declaration; (2) approximately 13 hours in connection with drafting the Anti-SLAPP Motion and supporting declarations; (3) approximately 8.2 total hours in reviewing Plaintiffs Opposition and Plaintiffs Objections and preparing the Reply and Defendants Objections (4) approximately 6.0 hours in preparing for and attending the hearing on the Anti-SLAPP Motion. Based on his hourly rate of $425/hour, Leer was billed approximately $15,937.50 in connection with Mr. Browns services for the Anti-SLAPP Motion. In opposition, Plaintiff contends that it is unreasonable for a seasoned to take 7.5 hours in drafting the motion, but that 6.5 hours to prepare and write the motion and the reply is 6.5 hours is reasonable. The court agrees, namely as the motion and reply did not provide a robust analysis as to whether Defendants conduct pertained to the public interest. (See e.g., Final Ruling, fn. 8.) Therefore, the court awards 10.3 hours (research) + 6.5 hours (drafting motion, reviewing opposition, and drafting reply) for a total of 16.8 hours at $425/hour for a total of $7,140.00. (For clarity, as to the anti-slapp motion, the court awards $8,202.50.) c. $11,000 for the instant motion Lastly, Defense Counsel seeks $11,000 in connection with the motion for attorney fees (20 hours (8 by Burns and 12 by Brown) in drafting motion, any necessary reply and preparing for and attending the hearing on this motion. Here, as the motion is largely a recitation of case law, the court determines a total of 6.9 hours is reasonable. [7] Therefore, the court awards $2,932.50 in connection with the motion for attorney fees (6.9 hours x $425/hour). Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the court grants the motion, but in the reduced amount of $11,135.00. [1] A Judicial Council form was used for the complaint and the substantive allegations are no more than a couple of conclusory sentences. [2] The opposition is slightly unclear as to its arguments as it does not go through each entry (e.g., Burns, Brown, and instant motion), but appears to largely focus on the work spent on the anti-slapp motion. With that, the court will take the general/overarching arguments raised by Plaintiff. [3] See 8/15/23 Final Ruling, p. 1, fn. 1 [A Judicial Council form was used for the complaint and the substantive allegations are no more than a couple of conclusory sentences.].) [4] To the extent in reply Defendant argues that fees incurred for multiple counsel are recoverable even if there is some duplication of work, the cases she cites to do not support that position because in both Balsam v Trancos, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 1083 and California DUI Lawyers Assn v California DMV (2022) 77 Cal. App. 5th 517, timesheets were submitted whereas here, no such timesheets have been provided. What is more, the latter case involved unique factual issues that required additional briefing; here, arguably, the complaint was lack that it could have been disposed of on possibly a demurrer. In any event, attorney fees rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Reply p. 2, citing Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 691, 698.) [5] He has 5 years of litigation experience. [6] In opposition, Plaintiff argues that work on defenses cannot be considered. (Opp. p. 4:10-11.) As noted in Reply, Plaintiff does not cite to legal authority to support this argument. [7] It appears Plaintiff argues 6.5 hours plus .4 hours is reasonable in connection with this motion. (See Opp. p. 5.) On March 26, 2024, the court issued its final ruling on Defendants demurrer and sustained it with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can properly plead a breach of contract cause of action[1] and granted the motion to seal. On April 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (FAC), wherein they withdrew their breach of fiduciary COA. On June 24, 2024, the court granted Defendant Christian Community Credit Union's Ex Parte Application to Extend Time to Respond to First Amended Complaint until July 15, 2024. According to the ex-parte application, The settlement is, in part, contingent on Credit Union not filing a demurer or motion to strike to the FAC in order to allow Plaintiffs to obtain leave of the Court to file a Second Amended Complaint in order to add a new party to this action and thereafter dismiss Credit Union. (6/21/24 Rubin Decl. ¶9, emphasis added.) On July 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave to file a SAC. On July 15, 2024, the parties appeared for the continued ex-parte hearing. The minute order provides, in relevant part, the following: Plaintiff's Counsel represent to the Court that he has reserved a Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend to File Second Amended Complaint on August 8, 2024, at the Pomona South Courthouse in Department O at 10:00 a.m. Further, Plaintiff's Counsel represents to the Court that if the above indicated motion is granted (there will be no opposition) then the parties will have reached a settlement agreement. Defendant Christian Community Credit Union's Ex Parte Application to Extend Time to Respond to First Amended Complaint is heard and GRANTED. Responsive Pleadings are not required prior to August 8, 2024. (emphasis added). Legal Standard The motion is brought pursuant to CCP section 473 (Amendment to Pleadings) and 389 (Compulsory Joinder). (Motion p. 2:23-24.) CCP Section 473: The court may, in furtherance of justice and on any proper terms, allow a party to amend any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Association (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) The court may also, in its discretion and after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a); Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 242.) The court may deny the plaintiffs leave to amend if there is prejudice to the opposing party, such as delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Id.) Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, a motion to amend a pleading before trial must (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a).) A separate supporting declaration specifying (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier must accompany the motion. (Id., rule 3.1324(b).)[2] CCP Section 389 Code of Civil Procedure section 389 articulates when a nonparty must be joined to the action. A person is a necessary and indispensable party where 1) complete relief cannot be obtained in the nonpartys absence, 2) the nonparty claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and disposition of such will (i) impair or impede the nonpartys ability to protect its interest or (ii) leave existing parties subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a); Olszewksi v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 808-809; Morrical v. Rogers (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 438, 460.) Whether a party is a necessary and indispensable party is at the discretion of the trial court and the court is to weight the factors of practical realities and other considerations. (Morrical v. Rogers, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 438, 461.) Determination that a person is a necessary party is a predicate for determination that person is an indispensable party. (Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1173.) For compulsory joinder, the basic rule is to join persons who are materially interested in the subject of an action whenever feasible. (Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004, 1018; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 785, 793.) Discussion Plaintiffs Proposed SAC seeks to add ICFG as a defendant and The Foothills of Gilroy Financial Supporters, LLC, a California limited liability company, as a plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiffs seeks to add the following COAs against ICFG: Unjust Enrichment; Chose in Action; Breach of Fiduciary Duties; Constructive Trust; and Request for Accounting added to the claim for Injunctive Relief. The purpose of the motion is to join ICFG as an additional party defendant so that the ownership of the subject Credit Union accounts may be determined and avoid multiple lawsuits and the possibility of inconsistent judgments. (Motion p. 4:14-18.) The amendment was not made earlier because Plaintiffs realized after conferring with Defendant Credit Union that resolution could not occur without naming ICFG as a Defendant. For all the reasons set forth in the motion, the court grants the motion. First, the court grants the motion abiding by the strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments. (Motion p. 5, citing Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 297; see also Motion p. 7 citing Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488- 489 [trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding&rest[ing] on the fundamental policy that cases should be decided on their merits.], internal citations omitted.) Next, the court grants the motion as ICFG is both a necessary and indispensable party to this matter. (Motion p. 7.) Here, Plaintiffs have become aware that ICFG asserts that it is the owner of Plaintiffs accounts. Accordingly, less than full participation by all parties claiming ownership would not result in complete relief because complete relief would entail a judicial determination of ownership that includes all parties claiming an ownership interest to be before the court and present their competing claims. (Motion p. 8:25-28.) Thus, denying leave to amend would prejudice all the parties, not just Plaintiffs. (Motion p. 7:2-4.) Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted. [1] Specifically, as to the breach of contract COA, though Plaintiffs presumably pled breach of a written contract, the allegation(s) were vague because the complaint premised the contract upon multiple documents and agreements. [2] The motion complies with rule 3.1324

Ruling

CARLA LEE VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, A PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.

Aug 08, 2024 |24STCV09176

Case Number: 24STCV09176 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 14 #13Case Background This is an action for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants negligently owned the premises at or near CLA Go. Inc. Lot-Dot Mangrove at East Temple St., Los Angeles, CA 90012. Specifically, Plaintiff was walking when she tripped and fell on uneven metal plates on the ground. On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff Clara Lee filed her Complaint against Defendants County of Los Angeles (County), the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), Skanska USA Civil West California District, Inc. (Skanska), and Traylor Bros., Inc. (Traylor Bros). On May 17, 2024, County filed an Answer. On May 30, 2024, Skanska USA Civil West California District, Inc. filed a demurrer. On June 11, 2024, Traylor Bros filed its demurrer. On June 13, 2024, MTA filed this demurrer. On July 9, Plaintiff filed an omnibus opposition to the demurrers filed by Skanska, Traylor Bros, and MTA. On August 1, 2024, MTA filed a reply. Instant Pleading MTA demurs to Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that it does not sufficiently allege a cause of action against it. Decision MTAs demurrer is OVERRULED. MTAs request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Discussion MTA demurs to the causes of action for negligence and premises liability on the grounds that (1) the Complaint does not allege that MTA owed Plaintiff a duty of care or how the duty was breached and (2) the Complaint does not allege causation. MTA also alleges the Complaint is uncertain on its face. The demurrer is substantially the same as earlier demurrers filed by Defendants Skanska and Traylor Bros. Therefore, the analysis is the same as the Courts analysis for those demurrers. The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm. (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The existence and scope of a property owners duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.) Civ. Code, section 1714(a) provides that everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself. Here, the Complaint alleges that all Defendants, including MTA, owned, managed, maintained, or operated the subject property located at or near Justin Ct. and CLA Gov. Inc., Lot-Dot Mangrove, East Temple St. Los Angeles, CA 90012. (Compl., pp.5, 7.) The Complaint also alleges that Defendants were negligent because metal plates existed on the premises which caused Plaintiff to trip and fall. (Id.) Defendants knew the condition existed and failed to barricade the area, warn of the condition, or adequately light the area. (Id.) Because the Complaint alleges all Defendants, including MTA, owned the subject property, the Complaint adequately alleges that MTA owed a duty of ordinary care to manage its property to avoid injury to Plaintiff. The Complaint also adequately alleges breach of this duty because it alleges MTAs employees knew of the uneven plates and failed to warn of its existence, barricade the area, or adequately light the area. Finally, the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants breach caused Plaintiffs injuries because it alleges Plaintiff tripped and fell as a result of Defendants failure to address the dangerous condition. Because the Complaint adequately alleges facts which support each element of negligence, the demurrer is overruled. Uncertainty A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Khoury v. Malys of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respondi.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 7:85 (emphasis in original).) The objection of uncertainty does not go to the failure to allege sufficient facts. (Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 459.) It goes to the doubt as to what the pleader means by the facts alleged. (Id.) Such a demurrer should not be sustained where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet. (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 882.) Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff tripped on uneven metal plates on property owned by all Defendants, including Traylor Bros. Plaintiff alleges that the area was located at or near Justin Ct. and CLA Gov. Inc., Lot-Dot Mangrove at East Temple St. Los Angeles, CA 90012. The Court finds this approximation is sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the location of the incident, and that these facts are sufficient to apprise Traylor Bros. of the issues it is to meet so that they may respond. The demurrer is OVERRULED on this ground.

Ruling

Aug 07, 2024 |19STCV20315

Case Number: 19STCV20315 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, August 7, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 10 PROCEEDINGS Kyle Brown v. Beach House Design & Development, et al. 19STCV20315 1. Barbara Browns Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Person with a Disability TENTATIVE RULING Barbara Browns Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Person with a Disability is granted. Background Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 11, 2019. Plaintiff was employed by ORourke Construction (ORourke), a subcontractor hired by the general contractor Defendant Beach House Design & Development (Beach House) for a construction project. On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff fell from a scaffold on the jobsite located at 1727 Monterey Boulevard, Hermosa Beach, California 90254. Plaintiff alleged a sole cause of action for General Negligence. Cross-Complaints were also filed by moving Defendant Beach House and by Defendant and moving party A&D Plastering, Inc. (A&D) another subcontractor on the project. Petitions to Approve Compromise of Pending Action of Minor A claim by or against a minor may be settled through compromise only with the approval of the court. A petition for approval must be presented to the court by the minors guardian. CCP § 372; Probate Code Secs. 2500-2507; 3413-3605. The court should consider the following factors: the circ*mstances of the accident, particularly the facts bearing on the payors liability and the minors damages; the amount of the proposed settlement; the method of payment; the nature of the injury and the minors current medical status (the petition should include a recent medical report); and the amount of attorneys fees being requested. Before the hearing, the court should make a preliminary determination of whether the proposed settlement and the method of payment appear reasonable in relation to the potential liability and the nature and extent of injuries. It is especially important to determine whether the minors condition is permanent, and whether it is stable or likely to worsen. The court should also make a preliminary determination as to whether the costs, expenses, and attorneys fees appear reasonable. The Court has reviewed the petition for compromise of pending action. The Court determines that the petition is reasonable as to the settlement amount. The Court finds that the settlement is in the best interests of the person with a disability. Pursuant to the petition, the disposition of the proceeds of the settlement funds cannot be approved until resolution of the entire action as set forth in Attachment 13 of the proposed order. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Petition to Approve Compromise of Pending Action of Person with a Disability is granted. Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Ruling

Robert Lucky vs. City of Fairfield et al

Aug 08, 2024 |CU23-01321

CU23-01321DemurrerTENTATIVE RULINGDefendant City of Fairfield’s demurrer to the first amended complaint is sustainedwithout leave to amend.Plaintiff’s allegation that he sustained injuries “while riding his bicycle when he cameinto contact with a dangerous and hazardous condition on the subject property, namelya pole that was negligently installed in the middle of a bicycle trail at FairfieldLinear Park” (FAC, § GN-1, emphasis added) establishes that Defendant, a publicentity, is entitled to trail immunity. (Gov. Code § 831.4; Nealy v. County of Orange(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 602-603; Burgueno v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (2015)243 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1060.) Trail immunity applies to paths, whether paved or Page 1 of 4unpaved, if they provide access to recreational activities or if recreational activities takeplace on them. (Lee v. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 206, 211.)Instead of opposing the motion, Plaintiff has simply submitted a proposed secondamended complaint, presumably attempting to show that leave to amend should begranted because the defect can be cured by the proposed allegations. But, not onlywould the proposed amendment replacing the specific allegation of “bicycle trail” with amore general “subject premises” and omitting the allegation that the trail was in FairfieldLinear Park constitute a sham pleading (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239,1248; Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425), it contains noallegation that might establish that trail immunity does not apply (see, Nealy, supra, 54Cal.App.5th at 602 [a plaintiff seeking tort liability against a public entity must pleadfacts sufficient to show that his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicablestatutory immunity]).

Ruling

MAKILA MOORER VS CITY OF COMPTON, ET AL.

Aug 06, 2024 |23CMCV00066

Case Number: 23CMCV00066 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: A 23CMCV00066 Makila Moorer v. City of Compton, et al. Tuesday, August 6, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT, CITY OF COMPTONS, PERSON MOST QUALIFIED; REQUEST FOR IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT, CITY OF COMPTONS, EMPLOYEE, DAMION TIMMONS; REQUEST FOR IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS I. BACKGROUND The complaint alleges that Plaintiff fell into a sidewalk/utility access hole allegedly, owned and maintained by Defendants which Plaintiff asserts was in a defective condition. (Complaint, ¶¶ 3-5.) The complaint asserts a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property. (Gov Code § 835.) Defendant, Pacific Bell Telephone Company dba AT&T (Pacific Bell) who answered the complaint on August 2, 2024, also filed a cross-complaint on the same date for indemnity and contribution against Defendant, City of Compton (City). II. ARGUMENTS Plaintiff served notice on the City for the deposition of a city employee, Damion Timmons, who provided a declaration on behalf of the City, asserting that the City did not have control over the utility box. Plaintiff also served a notice of deposition of Citys person most qualified (PMQ), ostensibly to determine whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and to marshal facts to determine whether the City was negligent in the maintenance, operation, control, or supervision of the utility box at issue. Plaintiff filed separate motions to compel the depositions of both witnesses but after lengthy efforts to schedule a date, the City ultimately refused to produce an appropriate PMQ or Mr. Timmons for deposition on May 23, 2024. Instead, the City filed a motion for sanctions under Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7 requesting the Citys dismissal, contending it did not own, control, or maintain the utility box at issue based on the Timmons declaration. On July 15, 2024, the court denied the motion. Following the Citys failure to appear at the deposition and produce both witnesses, Plaintiff attempted to meet and confer again on June 5, 2024. The City did not respond. The City did not file an opposition to either of Plaintiffs motions by July 24, 2024, nine court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b).) III. DISCUSSION Service of a deposition notice is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action or employee of a party to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280 subd.(b).) If a party or party-affiliated witness fails to appear for a deposition after service of a deposition notice, without having served a valid objection, the party giving notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document or tangible thing described in the notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450.) The moving party must show good cause for the deposition and an attempt to meet and confer following the nonappearance. (Id.) Plaintiff served a notice for Mr. Timmons and for the PMQ witnesss deposition on May 8, 2024, scheduled for May 23, 2024. (Habbas decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 11.) Defendant did not produce a witness and failed to respond to Plaintiffs effort to meet and confer following the Citys nonappearance. (Habbas decl., ¶ 19, Ex. 18.) As the City did not oppose both motions, there is no substantial justification for the Citys objection and failure to produce the witnesses. Plaintiff has shown good cause for both depositions given the Citys assertion that it did not have control over the utility box and given facts that Plaintiff must prove in order to prevail on her claim. Imposition of sanctions are warranted. The court finds that $400 per hour incurred by Plaintiffs counsel is reasonable. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the court grants Plaintiffs two motions to compel the deposition of Mr. Timmons and the Citys person most qualified. Defendant City is ordered to produce a witness or witnesses responsive to both deposition notices within 14 days of the courts order as requested by Plaintiff. The court imposes sanctions of $1,320 for both motions against Defendant, City of Compton, and its counsel, Dominique N. Westmoreland, jointly and severally, payable to Plaintiff within 14 days. The hours spent are reduced as Defendant did not oppose, and Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. Prepare two motions $200 x 4 hours $800.00 Appearance $200 x 2 hours 400.00 Filing fees $60 x 2 motions 120.00 Total for both motions $1,320.00

Ruling

JOSEPH BUDDENBERG VS TARGET CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 06, 2024 |22STCV40016

Case Number: 22STCV40016 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE August 6, 2024 CASE NUMBER 22STCV40016 MOTION (1) Demurrer to Espinozas Cross-Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Portions of Espinozas Cross-Complaint MOVING PARTY Defendant Target Corporation OPPOSING PARTY Cross-Complainant Enedino Espinoza MOTION On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff Joseph Buddenberg (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Target Corporation, Allied Universal, John Doe, and Does 1 to 50 for various causes of action including, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2022, he was exiting the premises at 735 S. Figueroa St. Los Angeles, when John Doe, a security guard, physically attacked and assaulted him. (Complaint ¶ 8.) On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Enedino Espinoza (Espinoza) as John Doe. On April 26, 2024, Espinoza filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, Target Corporation, and Roes 1 through 100. Espinoza asserts causes of action for: (1) total and equitable indemnity; (2) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (3) Negligence; (4) Assault; (5) Violations of Civil Code section 52.1; (6) Violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200; (7) and Civil Code sections 1708.8(c), and (8) 1708.7. The first six causes of action are asserted against Target Corporation. Espinoza alleges he was a security guard for Watermark Security Group Inc., which contracted with a Target store to provide security. (Cross Complaint ¶ 1, 4.) Target Corporation (Target) now demurs to the first six causes of action in the cross-complaint, arguing they are uncertain and do not state sufficient facts. Target also separately moves to strike references to punitive damages, treble damages, labor code penalties, civil penalties, attorneys fees, and preliminary and permanent injunctions. Espinoza opposes and Target replies. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to determine whether or not the & complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). MEET AND CONFER Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).) The Declaration of Jessica Farley, counsel for Target, states the following: [o]n June 19, 2024, my office sent a meet and confer letter outlining each of the deficiencies in the Cross-Complaint and asked for a response on or before June 24, 2024. . . . As of the date of filing this demurrer, Espinoza has still not responded to my meet and confer efforts. (Farley Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 2.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement is met. ANALYSIS As an initial matter, upon reviewing the cross-complaint, the Court finds that the pleadings are not so uncertain that Target cannot reasonably respond. Therefore, the Court will address the argument that the causes of action do not state sufficient facts. Here, the cross-complaint alleges that on the day of the incident, Plaintiff was recording Espinoza with his phone at the Target store and refused to leave the store. (Cross-complaint ¶12-13.) Espinoza alleges that Plaintiff continued to follow Espinoza while aiming his phone towards Espinozas face. Espinoza alleges that he never attacked Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 13.) Total and Equitable Indemnity The elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is ... equitably responsible. [Citation.] [Citation.] (Bailey v. Safeway, Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 206, 217.) [A] fundamental prerequisite to an action for partial or total equitable indemnity is an actual monetary loss through payment of a judgment or settlement. (Christian v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 466, 471.) Explained further, [t]he right to indemnity depends upon the principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own wrong, and if others have been compelled to pay damages which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from him. (Id. at 471-72 [internal quotations omitted].) Here, the cross-complaint states: Cross-Defendant TARGET and its agent Watermark, its insurer, and each of them, should be required to defend, indemnify and hold harmless ESPINOZA for any and all damages asserted against him and all costs, expenses for attorneys fees, and other incidental expenses incurred in defending the actions and/or in prosecution of this Cross-Complaint. By this action, ESPINOZA demands that Cross-Defendant TARGET, and each of them, pay all costs or fees incurred by or on his behalf and further indemnify ESPINOZA for all sums paid by way of judgment, settlement or otherwise in this action. (Cross-complaint ¶ 24.) In opposition, Espinoza argues that he has alleged sufficient damages by stating he has incurred attorneys fees and costs for defending Plaintiffs action. In reply, Target discusses contractual indemnification but fails to provide authority that an equitable indemnity cause of action cannot be asserted in a cross-complaint. (See Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197-98 [Subsequent cases established that under the principles articulated in American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899, a defendant may pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against other tortfeasors either (1) by filing a cross-complaint in the original tort action or (2) by filing a separate indemnity action after paying more than its proportionate share of the damages through the satisfaction of a judgment or through a payment in settlement.].) Therefore, the demurrer is overruled. Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civil Code section 1750 et seq., protects consumers from a broad range of unfair or deceptive business practices. Under the Act, in order to sue for money damages, a plaintiff must first provide the defendant with notice and a 30-day opportunity to cure the issue. (Civ. Code § 1782 (a).) The necessary elements of a CLRA cause of action are: (1) a consumer; (2) who suffers any damage; and (3) because of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Civil Code section 1770. (Civ. Code, §1780 (a); Buckland v. Threshold Ent., Ltd. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 809, 811 [actual reliance is an element of a CLRA claim sounding in fraud], overruled in other part by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 326-327.) Under the CLRA, a consumer is defined as an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes. (Civ. Code § 1761 (d).) Espinoza alleges: Espinoza brings this cause of action as a consumer of goods and services purchased from Target. . . . Target did undertake the provision of their goods and services to Espinoza and other consumers through unfair and deceptive practices. (Cross-complaint ¶ 26-27.) Here, the cross-complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Espinoza was acting as a consumer for purposes of the CLRA, but rather alleges that he was acting as a security guard. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained. Negligence The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendants breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) Generally a person does not have a duty to control another's conduct or to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct. However, a duty may arise where a special relationship exists giving rise to a right to such protection. [Citation.] [citation omitted.] Such a special relationship exists between a business establishment and its customers [which] as a matter of law places an affirmative duty on the proprietor to take reasonable precautions to protect patrons from reasonably anticipative criminal conduct of unknown third parties. [Citations.] (Balard v. Bassman Event Security, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 243, 247.) The duty is applicable to the agents and employees of the business establishment. (Id.) Here, Espinoza alleges: Cross-Defendant TARGET permitted ESPINOZA to be victimized, threatened with unreasonable and un-consented to force, stalked, assaulted, threatened and harassed. TARGET knew that this unreasonable conduct, constituting a assault was being committed, that further assault was going to be committed, substantially assisted BUDDENBERG to assault ESPINOZA and participated in the misconduct by permitting the conduct to continue giving the parties access to ESPINOZA, who they knew would be at the door and thereby would be having further contact with instigators, with no reprimand, restriction or removal from the premises. Cross-Defendant TARGET permitted ESPINOZA to be threatened with unreasonable and un-consented to force and threats constituting crimes. ESPINOZA is informed and believes that Cross-Defendant TARGETs manager was there and permitted the assault to occur, as well as BUDDENBERGs subsequent conduct of screaming false statements that ESPINOZA had attacked him, which were provably false by them, as depicted in their surveillance video, yet they did nothing to assist ESPINOZA. (Cross-complaint ¶ 35.) The cross-complaint alleges that Target breached a duty by failing to stop the alleged interaction with Espinoza and Plaintiff. Espinoza also alleges he was injured as a result of the breach. Therefore, the demurrer to the third cause of action for negligence is overruled. Assault The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed [he or] she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendants conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendants conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs harm. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.) Here, Espinoza alleges: Cross-Defendant TARGET permitted ESPINOZA to be threatened with unreasonable and un-consented to force and threats constituting crimes. ESPINOZA is informed and believes that Cross-Defendant TARGETs manager was there and permitted the assault to occur, as well as BUDDENBERGs subsequent conduct of screaming false statements that ESPINOZA had attacked him, which were provably false by them, as depicted in their surveillance video, yet they did nothing to assist ESPINOZA. (Cross-complaint ¶ 40.) Espinoza fails to state sufficient facts showing that Target acted with the requisite intent. Therefore, the demurrer for the fourth cause of action is sustained. Violation of Civil Code section 52.1 Civil Code, section 52.1 (the Bane Civil Rights Act) provides a civil remedy for persons whose exercise of constitutional rights has been interfered with by threats, intimidation, or coercion. (Civ. Code, § 52.1(a).) Section 52.1 requires an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion. (Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 334.) Bane Act liability occurs when a defendants threats, intimidation or coercion interferes or attempts to interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state. (Civil Code § 52.1(a); see City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1082, 1085-86 [plaintiff must allege and prove that defendant interfered with plaintiffs rights under federal or state law].) Although initially enacted to stem a tide of hate crimes [Citation], a plaintiff need not allege the defendant acted with discriminatory animus or intent; a defendant is liable if he or she interfered with the plaintiff's constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion [Citation.] (Simmons v. Superior Court (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1125.) The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 882-883; see also Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [Bane Act was intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights, where the act of interference with a constitutional right must itself be deliberate or spiteful, beyond just any tort, such as negligence].) Here, the cross-complaint alleges: As stated herein, Cross-Defendants have interfered with ESPINOZA s rights by assaulting him, permitting dangerous conditions at their premises, refusing to permit them to be addressed, through coercion and intimidation. (Cross-complaint ¶ 46.) However, the cross-complaint fails to allege facts that Defendant used threats, intimidation, or coercion to prevent Espinoza from exercising his constitutional or statutory rights, and does not specify the constitutional or statutory rights. The demurrer is sustained. Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 Unfair competition means any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) [S]ection 17200 is written in the disjunctive [and] establishes three varieties of unfair competitionacts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. [Citation.] The three prongs of the law have different thresholds. Under its unlawful prong, the UCL borrows violations of other laws ... and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL. [Citation.] Thus, a violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL's unlawful prong. In a consumer case, determining whether a business practice is unfair involves weigh[ing] the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim. [Citation.] (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1133.) A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619 [sustaining demurrer because the pleading did not identify a particular section of the statutory scheme which was violated and failed to describe with any reasonable particularity the facts supporting violation].) Espinoza alleges: Cross-Defendants their agents and employees acts, as specifically stated herein, constitute unfair business practices . . . . (Cross-complaint ¶ 50.) Here, the cross-complaint fails to identify a specific section of the statutory scheme that was violated and fails to sufficiently describe the facts supporting a violation. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained. Motion to Strike Target also moves to strike various portions of the cross-complaint. Because the demurrer to the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action is sustained, the motion to strike language in those causes of action is denied as moot. Therefore, the remaining issues to strike are: 3. Pg. 14, para. 56 (Cross-Defendants actions were willful, reckless, and exhibited a conscious disregard of the rights of ESPINOZA. Accordingly, ESPINOZA is entitled to punitive damages, according to proof.) 4. Pg. 15, para. 59 (Cross-Defendants actions were malicious, despicable, fraudulent, willful, reckless and exhibited a conscious disregard of the rights of ESPINOZA. Accordingly, ESPINOZA is entitled to punitive damages according to proof, as provided by California Civil Code §§ 52 and 3294.) 5. Pg. 16, para. 5 (For labor code penalties, punitive and exemplary damages according to prooof [sic], which for the purposes of any future default proceedings shall not exceed $1,000,000.00.) 6. Pg. 16, para. 6 (For statutory damages, civil penalties, and treble damages pursuant to Civil Code § 52 according to prooof [sic], which for purposes of any future default proceedings shall not exceed $1,000,000.) 7. Pg. 16, para. 7 (For attorneys fees, which for the purposes of any future default proceedings shall not exceed $1,000,000.00.) 8. Pg. 16, para. 10 (For a preliminary and permanent injunction.) Legal Standard California law authorizes a partys motion to strike matter from an opposing partys pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.) Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiffs rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. [Citation.] (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs interests. The additional component of despicable conduct must be found. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.) The statutes reference to despicable conduct represents a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards. (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime. (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further, [t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiffs interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences. (Flyers Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award for punitive damages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Lastly, [t]he mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circ*mstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) When seeking damages from an employer, an employer is not liable for punitive damages arising from an employees actions pursuant to Civil Code section 3294(a) unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294(b).) With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Id.) Analysis First, Target moves to strike language about punitive damages in paragraphs 56 and 59 that are not asserted against Target. As they relate to Cross-defendants which includes Target, the Court finds that Espinoza fails to plead sufficient facts. Nevertheless, because these paragraphs are asserted against Plaintiff, who has not joined in the motion, the motion to strike paragraphs 56 and 59 are denied. Next, the Court grants the motion to strike the following paragraph: 5. Pg. 16, para. 5 (For labor code penalties, punitive and exemplary damages according to proof [sic], which for the purposes of any future default proceedings shall not exceed $1,000,000.00.) Espinoza has not alleged Labor Code violations within the Cross-complaint. Therefore, he fails to provide a statutory basis for the damages. Regarding the following: 6. Pg. 16, para. 6 (For statutory damages, civil penalties, and treble damages pursuant to Civil Code § 52 according to proof [sic], which for purposes of any future default proceedings shall not exceed $1,000,000.) 7. Pg. 16, para. 7 (For attorneys fees, which for the purposes of any future default proceedings shall not exceed $1,000,000.00.) This prayer for relief pertains to causes of action asserted against other parties including Target. The Court grants the motion to strike to the extent that these paragraphs relate to Target for failing to allege sufficient facts of oppression, fraud, or malice by an officer, director, or managing agent, but otherwise denies the motion to strike. Any amended pleading may clarify the cross-defendant against whom relief is sought. Turning to the prayer for injunctive relief, [t]o obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) Similarly, [t]o qualify for a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of a cause of action involving the wrongful act sought to be enjoined and (2) the grounds for equitable relief, such as, inadequacy of the remedy at law. (City of South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293.) In opposition, Espinoza does not discuss the propriety of seeking injunctive relief in this case and fails to set forth that money damages would be inadequate. Therefore, the motion to strike Pg. 16, para. 10 (For a preliminary and permanent injunction.), is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court overrules Targets demurrer to the first and third causes of action in the cross-complaint. The Court sustains the demurrer to the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action with leave to amend. The Court grants in part Targets motion to strike with leave to amend. Moving party shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file a proof of service of such.

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